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1Summary
Summary
This report examines the impact of workfare schemes that mandate participation 
in unpaid work activities as a condition of receiving social assistance (‘work 
for benefits’). It reviews the evidence from three countries that operate workfare 
schemes: the United States (US), Canada and Australia. The report finds that 
there are few systematic evaluations that isolate the impact of workfare 
from other elements of welfare-to-work programmes such as compulsory 
job search activities. The limited evidence that does exist on workfare indicates 
that:
•	 Effectiveness in reducing welfare caseloads
– Dramatic reductions in welfare caseloads in the US and Canada cannot 
be attributed to workfare alone. Other elements of welfare reform such as 
intensive job search requirements and time limits on claiming have contributed 
to falling caseloads whilst economic growth has also enabled recipients to 
find work.
– Workfare has a deterrent effect which stops people claiming or encourages 
them to leave welfare before the workfare phase. This makes it harder to 
measure the tangible outcomes of welfare.
– The proportion of welfare recipients engaged in workfare is low in all 
three countries studied, even in the US which has the most extensive and 
well-established workfare programme. 
•	 Effectiveness	in	improving	employment	outcomes
– There is little evidence that workfare increases the likelihood of finding 
work. It can even reduce employment chances by limiting the time available 
for job search and by failing to provide the skills and experience valued by 
employers.
– Subsidised (‘transitional’) job schemes that pay a wage can be more 
effective in raising employment levels than ‘work for benefit’ programmes.
– Workfare is least effective in getting people into jobs in weak labour 
markets where unemployment is high.
– Levels of non-participation in mandatory activities are high in some 
workfare programmes.
2•	 Effectiveness	for	clients	with	multiple	barriers
– Workfare is least effective for individuals with multiple barriers to 
work.
– Welfare recipients with multiple barriers often find it difficult to meet 
obligations to take part in unpaid work. This can lead to sanctions and, 
in the most extreme cases, the complete withdrawal of benefits that leaves 
some individuals with no work and no income.
– Some states in the US have scaled down large-scale, universal workfare 
programmes in preference for ‘softer’ and more flexible models that 
offer greater support to those with the most barriers to work. This 
includes a greater reliance on subsidised jobs that pay wages rather than 
benefits to participants.
Summary
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1 Introduction
This report focuses on workfare schemes that mandate participation in unpaid 
work activities in the public, private or ‘not-for-profit’ sector as a condition 
of receiving benefits. These workfare activities are sometimes referred to as 
‘unpaid work experience’, ‘community service’ or ‘work for benefits’. Most 
workfare programmes have two explicit aims: to improve the employability and 
‘work habits’ of participants and to enforce the reciprocal responsibilities of those 
receiving social assistance through taking part in activities of benefit to the wider 
community.
The report addresses the impact of workfare in the US, Canada and Australia in 
terms of:
•	 the	design	and	coverage	of	national	and	state-level	workfare	schemes;
•	 the	 ability	 of	 workfare	 to	 raise	 the	 incomes	 and	 employment	 levels	 of	
participants;
•	 the	 effectiveness	 of	workfare	 in	 helping	 individuals	with	multiple	 barriers	 to	
work in finding employment.
The primary focus of this report is on workfare in the sense of unpaid work 
experience (‘work for benefits’) but, where relevant, it also considers the impact of 
subsidised job schemes (known as ‘transitional jobs’). These differ from workfare 
in paying a wage for participation in work activities in the private, public or not-
for-profit sector, usually in temporary placements. This provides an opportunity to 
compare the impact of workfare with an alternative approach.
The remaining chapters of the report are structured as follows:
•	Chapter 2 outlines the key features of workfare and highlights its role in wider 
welfare-to-work	programmes;
•	Chapters 3 to 5 review the impact of workfare in the three countries profiled, 
considering both the national and the local impact of workfare schemes.
4Most of the evidence presented in this report draws upon evaluations of workfare 
programmes. The predominant focus on the US is a reflection of the larger body 
of research which exists for US workfare schemes compared to programmes in 
Canada and Australia. It is important to note that the evidence on workfare 
is limited. Most research tends to evaluate welfare-to-work programmes in their 
entirety without isolating the impact of the workfare component. Even in the US, 
there has been no systematic research into the impact of workfare since 19931.
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2 Locating workfare in  
 welfare-to-work  
 programmes
Workfare is one of a number of work-related activities that may feature within 
broader welfare-to-work programmes. These include:
•	Workfare: ‘Work for benefits’, with participants required to engage in unpaid 
work experience as a condition of receiving social assistance.
•	 Subsidised employment: ‘Work for wages’, with participants paid directly by 
employers (usually subsidised by re-directing benefit payments directly to the 
employer).
•	Unsubsidised employment: Welfare recipients enter work but remain eligible 
for benefits to top up low wages. 
•	Vocational or educational activities.
Participation in one of these activities often becomes mandatory after an initial 
period of intensive job search activity. Both workfare and subsidised employment 
typically consist of short-term placements in the private, public or not-for-profit 
sector. These placements are usually combined with obligatory, on-going job 
search. Workfare may also have a deterrent effect by encouraging individuals 
to seek work without claiming welfare or to leave the programme before the 
mandatory work phase. The various pathways to workfare are summarised in 
Figure 2.1. 
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3 The US experience
In the US, most states operate workfare schemes as part of their obligations under 
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), 
introduced in 1996. This established Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF) as the core welfare programme for families with dependent children 
under the age of 18. Under TANF, all states are subject to a work participation 
requirement to engage at least 70 per cent2 of its welfare population in work-
related activities for at least 30 hours a week. As TANF programmes are designed 
and implemented at state level, there is considerable variation in the scope and 
nature of workfare programmes across the US.
3.1 The national impact
The US has experienced dramatic falls in welfare caseloads with the number of 
recipients falling over 50 per cent from 4.6 million families in 1996 to 2.1 million 
in 20023. This cannot be attributed to the impact of workfare alone, however, as 
the number of TANF recipients engaged in workfare has been consistently 
low. Despite the expectation that PRWORA would lead many states to develop 
large mandatory workfare schemes, few have done so. In 2002, only 40,000 TANF 
recipients were enrolled in mandatory work experience programmes in any given 
month, with two-thirds of them in just four states – New York, New Jersey, Illinois 
and Ohio4. As of 2006, only seven states had 25 per cent of TANF recipients 
engaged in workfare5. This is partly a consequence of the caseload reduction 
credit that reduced the work participation requirements of states by one per cent 
for every one per cent fall in the numbers claiming welfare. In 21 states, falling 
caseloads completely offset the work participation requirement and only 11 states 
had to engage more than ten per cent of TANF recipients in work activities. Other 
factors constraining the development of large-scale workfare schemes included 
administrative complexity, cost and political opposition6. 
To date there has only been one national review of the impact of workfare 
conducted by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC) in 
19937. This synthesised the results of previous MDRC evaluations that used surveys 
and experimental research designs to assess the impact of nine workfare schemes 
8(known as Community Work Experience Programmes (CWEPs)) across seven states. 
The report highlighted low levels of participation in workfare with less than six 
per cent of all welfare recipients involved in all but one of the programmes studied. 
This was attributed to participants being directed to job search activities rather 
than unpaid work experience. A survey of program supervisors also revealed a 
tendency to exempt clients with multiple barriers to work such as low levels 
of literacy, a lack of transportation, limited access to childcare or physical and 
emotional problems. Supervisors felt it was not beneficial to impose mandatory 
workfare obligations on clients unlikely to fulfil these requirements. 
Most significantly, the MDRC report found ‘little evidence that unpaid work 
experience leads to consistent employment or earnings effects’ among those 
engaged in workfare compared to control groups of non-participants. Three 
explanations were given for these limited outcomes:
•	 clients with multiple barriers did not benefit from unpaid work placements 
because workfare programmes did not provide the support necessary to address 
their	needs;
•	 the	 emphasis	 on	 unpaid	work	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 job	 search	 activity	made	 it	
difficult for clients to capitalise on their experience and obtain paid 
work;	
•	workfare was least effective in weak labour markets. The West Virginia 
CWEP had one of the highest proportions of welfare recipients in workfare 
programmes but was least successful in raising employment levels because 
unemployment levels of 18 per cent in the early 1980s constrained the 
possibilities for finding work.
The MDRC research did find, however, that participants felt it was fair to work 
in return for receiving benefits and that the work they performed was 
meaningful. Over 80 per cent also agreed that unpaid work placements increased 
their employability and would help them get a decent paying job later. 
Since the publication of the MDRC study in 1993, there have been no national 
evaluations of workfare. A report by the General Accounting Office (GAO)8 in 
2000, reviewing nine workfare programmes, noted that while states monitored 
employment outcomes for all welfare recipients, none collated data for only 
those engaged in workfare. This meant that falls in welfare caseloads could 
not be attributed to workfare alone. Other components of welfare-to-work 
programmes as well as a growing economy could also have contributed 
to falling levels of welfare receipt. The GAO report also cited evidence based 
on conversations from worksite administrators that levels of non-participation 
among welfare recipients mandated to take part in workfare activities 
was high. This claim is supported by other research showing that levels of non-
participation reached 50 per cent at some work experience sites9. 
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93.2 The local impact
The four states profiled in this section reflect the considerable variation in the scale 
and design of workfare. New York and Wisconsin offer prime examples of large-
scale, universal workfare programmes that have attracted considerable attention 
for their tough sanctions regime, although recent moves towards ‘softer’ forms 
of workfare suggest a change of direction. By contrast, both Washington State 
and Vermont operate subsidised job schemes that pay wages rather than benefits 
to participants. The success of these subsidised job programmes compares 
well with the less favourable outcomes for conventional workfare programmes.
3.2.1 New York City: The Work Experience Programme
New York City implemented a large municipal workfare scheme called the Work 
Experience Programme (WEP) in the 1990s. Though initially for General Assistance 
recipients (able-bodied individuals without children), it was later extended to all 
TANF recipients. Participants are required to work three days a week, with the 
remaining two devoted to job search activity10. The most common placements 
include sweeping streets and cleaning public buildings and parks, although some 
administrative work is available. The work is unpaid and failure to engage in 
mandatory activities leads to benefit sanctions.
WEP is the largest workfare scheme in the US with the number of participants 
peaking at over 30,000 in 1996, although this declined to 17,000 by 2001. During 
the same period, welfare caseloads fell by 26 per cent. However, the evidence 
suggests the programme has had a limited impact on employment outcomes 
with Human Resources Administration (HRA) records showing that only five per 
cent of WEP participants found jobs11. WEP has also been criticised for limiting 
the time available for job search, with work placements taking up every weekday 
morning12. There is also evidence that caseload reductions are partly the result 
of sanctions off benefits rather than entry into unsubsidised work13. A GAO 
report14 cited concerns from legal advocates in New York ‘that many people in 
need of assistance may have left TANF rolls or received reduced grants because 
they did not want to, or could not, perform the assigned work and that some of 
these families may move more deeply into poverty without the aid they need’.
This has prompted a shift towards a less punitive model, particularly for individuals 
with multiple barriers to work. The use of unpaid WEP placements as the sole 
form of work-related activity has decreased dramatically. While 75 per cent 
of welfare recipients were involved in unpaid work experience without access 
to any additional support in 1996, this had fallen to 12 per cent in 2001. Most 
participants now combine placements with involvement in programmes providing 
services to those with special needs such as substance abuse, mental health or 
literacy problems15. This includes the Personal Inroads to Individual Development 
and Employment (PRIDE) programme for individuals with mental or physical 
health problems. The development of these programmes is an explicit recognition 
that basic workfare programmes have not provided clients with multiple 
barriers with the additional support they need to find employment.
The US experience
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New York City has also increased the number of wage-paying subsidised 
jobs available to welfare recipients relative to unpaid work experience 
placements. This shift was prompted by a recognised need to provide less 
punitive forms of activity for recipients reaching federal time limits as the job 
market tightened in the 2001/02 recession16. The New York Parks Department 
redesigned its programme accordingly so that work placements consisted of both 
WEP positions and newly-created subsidised jobs made available through the Parks 
Opportunity Program (POP)17. In May 2003, there were only 1,000 unpaid WEP 
placements compared to 1,800 paid POP placements with the number of POP 
placements set to increase further. This highlights a shift away from a strict, 
‘one-size-fits-all’ workfare programme towards a more diverse model that 
provides additional support for clients with multiple needs and increasingly 
seeks to reward participants with wages rather than benefits.
3.2.2 Wisconsin: Wisconsin Works (W-2)
The Wisconsin Works (W-2) welfare-to-work programme is one of the most studied 
in the US because the 80 per cent fall in welfare caseloads in the decade to 2000 
is among the highest achieved by any state18. Wisconsin also has the highest 
proportion of welfare recipients in workfare with over 40 per cent participating 
in unpaid Community Service Jobs (CSJs) in 200219. The underlying rationale of 
placements is to develop ‘work habits and skills’ and to make receipt of public 
assistance contingent on performing work that is also seen to benefit the wider 
community20. CSJs consist of unpaid work experience in one of five categories 
of	worksites:	(1)	thrift	store	work;	(2)	office	and	customer	service	work;	(3)	care	
work	involving	adults	or	children;	(4)	light	industrial	and	housekeeping	work;	and	
(5) vocational training. These placements are one of four ‘tiers’ of work-related 
activity that can be mandated within W-2:
•	 1:	Unsubsidised employment.
•	 2:	 Subsidised employment in three month work placements that pay the 
minimum wage (Trial Jobs).
•	 3:	Unpaid work experience (workfare) in Community Service Jobs.
•	 4:	 Supported work or work-related activities (including drug/health 
treatment) for individuals with multiple barriers (known as W-2 Transition).
A recent report21 claims that substantial caseload reductions in Wisconsin 
cannot be attributed to workfare alone for two reasons: Firstly, W-2 is designed 
to divert individuals into work before they reach the workfare phase and this 
makes attribution difficult. Secondly, economic growth accounted for some of the 
increase in employment levels. The report also cites evidence that participation in 
W-222 does not lead to sustained employment in unsubsidised work for the 
majority of participants. Although between one-half and two-thirds of leavers 
found unsubsidised work at some point in each of the three years after welfare, 
less than half were continuously employed in this period. It also estimates 
that in 1997 approximately half of those leaving W-2 had incomes below the 
The US experience
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poverty line, while nearly 20 per cent of leavers received no income at all from 
earnings. Non-participation in workfare is also high with a separate evaluation 
of W-2 in Milwaukee County23 citing estimates that the absence rate varied from 
30-70 per cent across worksites. 
Recent developments indicate that Wisconsin is scaling back its basic workfare 
programme. In April 2008, the state governor, Jim Doyle, announced a transitional 
jobs pilot called ‘Real Work for Real Pay‘ (RWRP) that will place W-2 participants in 
‘real jobs, where they can earn a pay check, gain work experience and develop the 
skills needed to remain employed and become self sufficient’. RWRP participants 
will receive a wage from the employer and intensive job coaching and on-site 
support for an average of four months. When the wage subsidy ends, the employer 
is expected to retain the RWRP participant as an unsubsidised employee.24 Unlike 
the Trial Jobs component of W-2 which only offered employers $300 to provide 
subsidised work placements, employers will now be recompensed for the full 
costs of providing placements25. With both New York and Wisconsin replacing 
some workfare placements with subsidised jobs, there is a discernible shift away 
from more punitive, universal ‘work for benefits’ models towards schemes 
where recipients are paid a basic wage.
3.2.3 Washington State: The WorkFirst Programme
Washington State is unique in evaluating the impact of participation in workfare 
relative to other mandatory TANF activities within its WorkFirst welfare-to-work 
programme. This ‘WorkFirst Study’26 surveyed 3,000 families in March 1999 to 
measure the employment and earnings outcomes for participants undertaking 
unpaid work experience (workfare) compared to those in subsidised ‘Community 
Jobs’ (CJs). These CJs were introduced in 1998 for individuals with multiple barriers 
to work who have received benefits for 24 months. Participants must work up to 
twenty hours a week for nine months but are supported through an intensive 
case management approach that helps them to cope with the demands of the 
job. Clients are also required to enrol in a complementary activity such as basic 
education or substance abuse or treatment for an additional 20 hours a week.
The WorkFirst survey data showed that subsidised CJs generated far better 
outcomes than unpaid work experience. Workfare placements increased 
employment by only 13 per cent compared to 33 per cent for those in CJs, whilst 
workfare increased the quarterly earnings of participants by only $45 in the year 
following placements in contrast to a $792 increase for those who had been 
engaged in CJs. These stark findings on the poor performance of unpaid work 
experience prompted the State Legislature and the governor to discontinue the 
workfare component of the WorkFirst programme27. 
A separate survey of 1,100 CJ leavers found that 72 per cent left for unsubsidised 
employment, with 45 per cent of those leavers sustaining employment for the 
two years tracked. Overall, the average income of those who found work rose by 
60 per cent28. Programme officials even reported that the number of CJ slots was 
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insufficient to meet demand because the program lacked funding to provide the 
number of slots requested by welfare recipients29.
3.2.4 Vermont: The Community Service Employment Programme
Vermont’s Welfare Restructuring Project (WRP) operated from 1994-2001 
and required single parent welfare recipients to work after 30 months of cash 
assistance. Those who could not find an unsubsidised job were placed in a 
subsidised, minimum wage Community Service Employment (CSE) position. CSE 
positions were designed to look like ‘real’ jobs and, unlike workfare, participants 
received wages and qualified for in-work tax credits. Anyone turning down a CSE 
position had cash payments replaced by ‘vendor payments’ for housing, food and 
utilities.
An MDRC evaluation30 found that CSE jobs were rarely used with only two per 
cent of the 3,000 single parents studied working in a CSE position within four 
years after beginning a claim. Employment outcomes for the limited number 
of participants were favourable, however, with 51 per cent employed in an 
Unemployment Insurance (UI)-covered job either in the first quarter or second 
quarter since beginning their the CSE placement. 
The MDRC evaluation also found that participants in CSE jobs were largely positive 
about the scheme. A significant majority (89 per cent) considered it fair to be required 
to carry out a CSE assignment, while two-thirds agreed their position seemed like 
a ‘real’ job. In addition, 82 per cent agreed that their placement provided a good 
opportunity to get training or experience for future jobs. These findings indicate 
that subsidised work placements were valued by participants.
The US experience
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4 The Canadian experience
The Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST) of 1996 replaced 50/50 cost-
sharing of welfare costs between federal and provincial governments with block 
grants to provinces. This legislation also removed prohibitions on conditionality to 
enable provinces to develop workfare schemes as part of local welfare-to-work 
programmes. Whilst welfare receipt was not subject to time limits as in the US, 
most provinces moved to impose part or full sanctions for clients who did not 
meet work requirements.
4.1 The national impact 
Welfare caseloads have fallen significantly in Canada, with employment rates 
for lone mothers increasing by 19 per cent between 1998 and 2003. The extent 
to which workfare contributed to this increase is not known, however, as no 
national evaluation has been conducted since the passage of welfare reform in 
1996. A report published by Human Resources Development Canada in 2000 
noted that ‘the evaluation of welfare reform and labour market interventions has 
not received the same attention and funding in Canada that it has in the United 
States’31. There is a similar lack of evaluations of workfare at a provincial level32 
with the exception of the Ontario Works (OW) programme. 
4.2 The local impact: Ontario Works 
OW was introduced in 1997 with a work-first approach that places minimal 
investment in human capital and privileges immediate and intensive job-search 
on the basis that ‘any job is a good job’33. OW has three components including 
workfare (Community Placements), all of which are backed by sanctions for non-
participation:
•	 Employment Support: a basic range of services (computers, faxes and 
telephones) to help participants look for work.
•	 Employment Placement: subsidised employment placements in the private 
sector for up to six months.
The Canadian experience
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•	Community Placements: unpaid work experience in non-profit agencies, the 
public sector and community and environmental groups for up to 70 hours a 
month.
By 2000, 69,000 welfare recipients were engaged in the workfare component – 
Community Placements – of OW34. These Community Placements are now the 
most intensively used stream, with a recent survey35 finding 40 per cent of lone 
parents in the provincial capital, Toronto, engaged in mandatory unpaid work 
with volunteer organisations. This compared to 12 per cent involved in education 
and training and five per cent placed in unsubsidised jobs. Following the 
implementation of OW, welfare caseloads fell dramatically from 152,555 in 
1998 to 70,107 in 2004 (a 54 per cent decrease), although this decline cannot be 
attributed to workfare alone. Sustained economic growth during the same period 
has also helped to raise employment levels36. Moreover, caseload reductions do 
not always reflects entries into work with official figures on the destination of 
welfare leavers showing that only 60 per cent found employment37.
There are no evaluations that isolate the impact of the workfare component of 
OW although some research examines outcomes for all OW participants. A 2001 
survey of 804 former OW participants carried out by the Toronto Community and 
Neighbourhood Services38 found that only 56 per cent left for jobs. Of those that 
found employment, much of the work secured was short-term or low-paid, 
with 30 per cent of leavers in temporary jobs, a further 30 per cent in part-time 
work and just over one-third of those entering employment earning less than $10 
an hour – widely accepted as the benchmark for the ‘working poor’. Qualitative 
research on OW participants in Toronto also showed that welfare recipients felt 
pressured to take poor-quality jobs that were either detrimental to long-term 
labour market prospects or unrealistic given personal barriers 39. Some of those 
who found jobs also claimed they experienced extreme financial difficulties and 
job insecurity. 
The Canadian experience
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5 The Australian experience
Australia introduced a national workfare programme – Work for the Dole (WfD) – 
in 1997 that mandated unpaid work experience for 18-24 year-olds who had been 
unemployed for six months. The scheme was later extended to all jobseekers under 
50. Participants work for up to six months on community projects run by councils, 
charities and community organisations and receive a $20 a fortnight supplement on 
their unemployment payments. Placements are made in organisations involved in 
heritage, the environment, arts, community care, tourism, sport and the provision, 
restoration and maintenance of community services and facilities. Whilst WfD is 
designed to improve participants’ employability and ‘work habits’ and provide 
work of tangible value to the local community, it does not explicitly aim to improve 
employment outcomes. The emphasis is on fulfilling reciprocal responsibilities 
(known as ‘Mutual Obligation’) rather than enhancing employment prospects.
5.1 The national impact
By 2002, over 170,000 people had undertaken WfD placements and an official 
net impact study showed that participation raised employment outcomes by 
seven per cent compared to a control group of non-participants40. However, 
other research found that WfD was ineffective in helping participants find 
sustainable employment with only one-quarter in work three months after 
leaving the programme and 14 per cent employed in full-time jobs41. The report 
compared these outcomes unfavourably with previous welfare-to-work schemes 
such as Jobstart and Jobskills that placed 59 per cent and 41 per cent in work, 
respectively. The scheme also appears to have had little impact on very long-
term unemployment (over five years) which grew by 68 per cent from 75,000 to 
127,000 between 1999 and 2004.
WfD has also been criticised for reducing the time available for jobsearch. A quasi-
experimental study42 of WfD found that participants were less likely to find 
work than a control group because unpaid work experience placements 
had a ‘chilling’ effect on job search activity. The programme has also faced 
criticism for not providing participants with the skills and experience 
necessary to gain employment. WfD is designed so that workfare placements 
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do not replicate private sector employment to avoid displacing existing jobs. An 
OECD report noted that this ‘favours unskilled work with little opportunity for 
training which may impede integration of the unemployed into gainful work’43. 
Qualitative research with WfD participants also showed that many resented being 
compelled to do work they did not enjoy and that did not equip them with the 
skills they needed to find work44.
Recent developments indicate that the new Rudd administration will relax 
the rules governing participation in WfD. Whilst the government did not scrap 
WfD as expected in the May 2008 budget, they announced their intention to make 
participation mandatory after 18 months rather than the current six months. More 
money will be also provided for engaging the unemployed in training before they 
reach the 18-month limit and to help the most disadvantaged jobseekers find 
work45.
Additional research claims that the tough sanctions regime underpinning WfD 
and other Australian labour market programmes may have a detrimental 
effect on labour market prospects. In 2000/01 alone, a total of 350,000 
penalties were imposed that ‘counterproductively diminishe[d] many jobseekers 
prospects of finding employment’, with the burden falling disproportionately on 
young people and indigenous Australians46.
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